CASE LAW - Defence of Necessity

Tejveer Parmar successfully used the defence of necessity to defend himself against a charge of speeding. He was initially convicted in traffic court but appealed the conviction. The justice agreed, allowed the appeal, quashed the ticket conviction and acquitted him of speeding.

Traffic Court

The incident that resulted in the speeding ticket took place on the Kittson Parkway in Delta.

Mr. Parmar testified at trial in traffic court that another driver had continually pulled in front of his vehicle and braked. He decided that the only opportunity available to him was to exceed the posted speed limit and pass this vehicle in order merge safely into traffic.

The traffic court justice convicted him for travelling 81 km/h in the 50 km/h zone.

The Appeal

Mr. Parmar appealed the conviction based on the fact that at his trial the traffic court justice did not listen to his explanations for exceeding the speed limit.

Defence of Necessity

Madam Justice Murray found that the justice erred in not considering Mr. Parmar's defence:

[6] While I accept that traffic court trials have to be expedient the transcript shows that the JJP interrupted Mr. Parmar continually throughout his evidence. Despite this Mr. Parmar was given a chance, although perhaps not as fully as he would have liked, to explain why he did what he did. However in his reasons for finding Mr. Parmar guilty the JJP failed to consider Mr. Parmar’s explanation resting only on his admission that he was at that point exceeding the speed limit as follows:

He went over 50 kilometres and that is the only finding I have to be satisfied with…

[7] In reaching this conclusion the learned JJP failed to consider the defence proffered by Mr. Parmar, namely that he had to speed up in order to drive safely.

She went on to say:

[14] I accept the appellant’s evidence that in an effort to avoid the car that was being driven dangerously he sped up so he could merge in front of him. I further accept that the other option, to slow down and let the other car merge in front of him, was unsafe given that the driver of the other car had moved in front of him and braked.

[15] As per Dickson J. as he then was in Perka (quoted above), in order to bring the defence of necessity “the accused places before the court sufficient evidence to raise the issue, the onus is on the Crown to meet it beyond a reasonable doubt.”

[16] I am satisfied that Mr. Parmar has raised the defence of necessity. I am further satisfied that the Crown has not met that defence beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Learn More

• Read the Reasons for Judgment - R v Parmar

Share This Article